Wal-Mart is the largest company in the world, yet little is known about its economic impact. This essay discusses what is known about Wal-Mart's competitive advantage and its economic impact on local communities, as well as the national and global economy, and highlights the open questions to be addressed by future research.
and Rai, 2006; Reuters, 2007) .
Wal-Mart's size alone warrants studying its effects on the U.S. economy. By the end of 2005, 46 percent of Americans lived within 5 miles of the nearest Wal-Mart or Sam's Club store, and 88 percent lived within 15 miles of the nearest store; and Wal-Mart accounted for nearly 9 percent of all retail workers in the United States. Because the chain has a presence in so many markets, virtually all other retailers compete head-to-head with WalMart: 67 percent of all retail stores in the U.S. are located within 5 miles of a Wal-Mart.
In addition, Wal-Mart has been a leader in the retail sector on many fronts: its investments in information technology, its transformation of supply-chain relationships by establishing private-label brands and purchasing more products directly from overseas producers, and its embrace of a low-service "one-stop shopping" format have all been emulated by other retailers. As the retail sector continues to evolve, Wal-Mart provides a useful prism through which to evaluate these changes, and its current innovations may well be harbingers of the future.
Wal-Mart's growth has coincided with and amplified several existing trends in the U.S. retail sector. In this context, Wal-Mart's rise is as much a cause as it is an effect of larger changes in technology, trade patterns, and consumer tastes. Between 1963 -a year after the first Wal-Mart store opened in Rogers, Arkansas -and 2002 , the number of single-store retailers in the United States declined by 55 percent while the number of chain stores nearly doubled. The number of stores belonging to chains with 100 or more stores more than tripled over this period. Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target, and Costco combined still account for a very small fraction of all retail stores, but they represent an increasing and disproportionate share of all dollar sales.
The competitive pressures created by large retailers have long been controversial. As far back at the 1920s, retail chains have been accused of "paying low wages, not contributing to their communities, taking money out of communities, paying fewer taxes than local merchants, and turning America into 'a nation of clerks' " (Ross, 1984, p. 247) . Though the identity of large retailers has changed over time, very similar accusations are leveled against Wal-Mart today. Even as consumers flock to shop at Wal-Mart, many express concerns about its economic impact. In a Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2005) survey, 19 percent of respondents with a Wal-Mart store in their area thought that it had had a negative effect locally, and 24 percent of all respondents thought that Wal-Mart was bad for the country. Perhaps not surprisingly, non-Wal-Mart shoppers were nearly four times more likely than those who shop at Wal-Mart regularly to think Wal-Mart had had a negative effect on their area, and more than four times as likely to think that Wal-Mart has had a bad effect on the country (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2005 ). This paper begins by exploring the source of Wal-Mart's competitive advantage. It then examines some of the economic effects of Wal-Mart: how Wal-Mart stores affect local labor markets, consumer prices, product selection, local and global competitors, and suppliers.
Sorting out cause and effect in these studies can be tricky, because the location of WalMart stores is an endogenous choice. If the places in which Wal-Mart opens stores are systematically different from the places it avoids -for example, if it prefers thriving areas, shying away from declining ones -or if Wal-Mart opens stores during temporary periods of growth, a nave "before-and-after" look would conclude that Wal-Mart has had a more positive effect than it actually does. I then turn to Wal-Mart's interaction with public policy issues in matters of global trade, as well as state and local legislation on wages, benefits, zoning, and subsidies. This paper aims to dispel some of the myths regarding Wal-Mart, and to replace them with a systematic accounting of what is known about Wal-Mart's impact on the U.S. and global economy. Media reports often portray Wal-Mart as a "job destroyer" and a force that levels Main Streets, but there is little evidence to support this view: Wal-Mart's impact on jobs is modest, and probably positive; and the effect on other businesses is also relatively small. In the process, I highlight potential areas for future research and discuss available data sources as well as some methodological pitfalls.
Wal-Mart's Advantage
While Wal-Mart's advantage over other retailers has been undisputed for some time, the sources, and magnitude, of this advantage are not fully understood. Part of the reason for this is that retailers' production function -the relevant inputs and outputs, and the relationship between them -has only recently begun to receive serious academic attention.
(For an overview of this topic, see Betancourt, 2005 .) Nevertheless, a number of studies by industry analysts and academic economists provide a glimpse into the sources of Wal-Mart's advantage.
By all accounts, technology and scale are at the core of Wal-Mart's advantages over its rivals. Across the retail sector, stores that belong to retail chains tend to be more efficient than single-store retailers, and chains tend to invest more in information technology (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2006; Doms, Jarmin, and Klimek, 2004) . Wal-Mart's technological edge is in its logistics, distribution, and inventory control; having installed a computer in its first distribution center in 1969, it had, by the late 1970s, connected all Wal-Mart stores and distribution centers, along with company headquarters, to a computer network. Wal-Mart was an early adopter of bar-code technology. It installed bar-code readers in all distribution centers by the late 1980s, reducing by half the labor cost of processing shipments (Vance and Scott, 1994) . In 1990, Wal-Mart introduced Retail Link, software connecting its stores, distribution centers, and suppliers, providing detailed inventory data "to bring our suppliers closer to our individual stores" (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1991, p. 3) . Wal-Mart is currently at the forefront of efforts to integrate Radio Frequency Identification -a technology in which each individual item receives a tag that can be read by a radio signal, thus facilitating tracking shipments, inventory, and sales. Wal-Mart also operates the largest private satellite communications network in the world.
Empirically, it is difficult to distinguish between two explanations for Wal-Mart's size and high efficiency level. On one hand, Wal-Mart may have lower costs than other retailers, and this cost advantage could be responsible for its growth. Alternatively, Wal-Mart's expansion could have allowed it to take advantage of economies of scale, reducing its costs relative to competitors. argue that these two explanations are closely related: Wal-Mart's better technology has allowed it to grow, and this growth has lowered its operating costs through economies of scale. Viewed this way, economies of scale at both the store and chain levels amplify Wal-Mart's advantage, rather than being its root cause.
At the chain level, Wal-Mart's scale has increased its market power in input markets.
Size also gives Wal-Mart an advantage in any activity that involves a fixed cost, such as contracting with foreign suppliers, so Wal-Mart can import at lower average cost than other retailers, spurring further growth. also argue that scale reduces the marginal cost of a sale: using data for Wal-Mart, they calculate that elasticity of the marginal cost associated with an additional sale with respect to sales volume is approximately -0.2; in other words, a 10 percent increase in total sales volume decreases marginal cost by 2 percent.
At the store level, the availability of bar code technology and now Radio Frequency Identification that reduces inventory tracking costs increases the incentives of stores to add product lines (Holmes, 2001) . After adding pharmacies and auto services to its stores in the 1980s, Wal-Mart entered the supermarket industry in 1988 with a single Supercenter in Washington, Missouri. (Supercenters sell a full line of groceries in addition to general merchandise, such as clothes, housewares, toys, and cosmetics.) Wal-Mart currently operates more than 2,200 U.S. Supercenters, and is the largest supermarket chain, by sales, in the United States. The interaction of economies of scale and scope increases Wal-Mart's optimal chain size as its stores grow, and the stores' optimal size as the chain grows (Basker, Klimek, and Van, 2007) .
Wal-Mart locates its stores in places where it expects to be profitable, taking into consideration, as much as possible, information about demand and cost factors, as well as the competitive environment and how it is expected to evolve after Wal-Mart's entry. Holmes (2006) and Jia (2005) discuss various demographic factors that predict Wal-Mart's entry, such as the size and density of the population, and the age and income distributions. These, and other variables that are harder to observe and measure, tend to be spatially correlated: urban counties are located near other urban counties; counties with a given industrial composition tend to be located near other counties with a similar composition, and so on. Such correlations partly explain why Wal-Mart stores tend to locate near one another, an observation first made by Graff and Ashton (1994) The downside of opening stores close to each other is the potential for cannibalizing sales. However, opening stores close to each other has also allowed Wal-Mart to exploit economies of density in distribution, training, and advertising (Holmes, 2006) . This positive effect appears to have overwhelmed any negative effect on profit due to self-cannibalization.
Wal-Mart's expansion strategy also helps to explain the firm's success relative to Kmart and Target, which had different expansion strategies (Graff, 1998; Holmes, 2006) . Holmes (2006) estimates a structural demand model that takes into account both population and store characteristics, and a cost function that depends on store-level employment and the store's distance to the nearest distribution center. He then compares store-by-store operating profits (actual dollar sales less estimated costs based on known store-level employment and other factors) with those that would have obtained had the store faced the same demand conditions but different costs. His estimates suggest that, all else equal, locating a store immediately next to a distribution center increases its annual operating profit by $220,000 (in 2005 dollars) relative to locating it 100 miles away.
The combination of technological prowess and economies of scale, scope, and density have made Wal-Mart a major contributor to the overall increase in productivity in the retail sector. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, Table 1 (2006) provide some detail -and contrasting perspectiveson the quality of the data. Other data on Wal-Mart store openings are also available. Following a recent public relations campaign, Wal-Mart selectively released data on store openings it had previously been reluctant to share; Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2005) were the first to use these data, which have since also been used by Basker (2006) . In late 2005, Wal-Mart posted a spreadsheet with the original opening dates of its existing stores on its public relations site, http://www.walmartfacts.com but later modified the spreadsheet by removing the opening dates and years. Dube, Eidlin, and Lester (2007) use these data. An anti-WalMart umbrella group called Wal-Mart Watch, which can be contacted at http://www.walmartwatch.com, has also compiled a list of all Wal-Mart's store locations and opening dates, along with store characteristics, including employment and square footage, which it makes available to researchers who sign a confidentiality agreement. Store-level characteristics are also available from TradeDimensions, a unit of ACNeilsen, and have been used by Holmes (2006) . In another analysis, Drewianka and Johnson (2006) estimate Wal-Mart's job effects in an ordinary least squares specification that includes a full set of county-specific trends, and find small, but positive, employment effects. They argue that the use of county-specific trends allows them to sidestep the identification problem by controlling for trends that pre-date WalMart, and which are likely to have influenced its entry decision. This specification is valid, providing unbiased estimates of Wal-Mart's causal impact, if Wal-Mart selects locations based only on a country's growth rate, and is not influenced by other factors which are also correlated with future economic performance.
On balance, it seems clear that Wal-Mart's has a small net impact on retail and wholesale jobs. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that effects on aggregate county-level employment -across all sectors in the local economy -cannot be precisely estimated (Basker, 2005a) .
On average, about 12 percent of a county's workers are employed in the retail sector, and another 6 percent in the wholesale sector. While it is possible to detect, with some statistical confidence, fluctuations of 20-100 jobs in a sector that employs only a few hundred, or even a couple of thousand, workers, it is nearly impossible to do this at the aggregate level when 50 jobs are less than 1 percent of total employment.
These results remain open to various questions. For example, county-level data on retail employment do not distinguish between part-time and full-time jobs, so if Wal-Mart employs more part-time workers than the retailers it replaces, the total number of jobs may rise while the number of full-time equivalent jobs actually falls. Unfortunately, there is no definitive evidence on average hours of work by Wal-Mart employees compared with other retail employees, and at present the importance of this effect is unknown.
In addition, any gains in retail employment in the county in which Wal-Mart opens may come at the expense of jobs across county lines. To this point, attempts to quantify cross-county effects have not been successful (Basker, 2005a) . One possible indirect test is that the county-level employment effect of Wal-Mart should be relatively larger (more positive) when Wal-Mart opens close to a county line -so that some of its competitors are in another county -than when it is located far from any neighboring counties. Another way to evaluate the importance of this explanation would be to estimate the rate at which Wal-Mart's impact diminishes with distance using finer geographic data -for example from Zip Code Business Patterns. Neither of these approaches has been pursued to date.
Very little is known about Wal-Mart's effect on the composition of the work force -its age, education, and experience -and the wages and benefits it receives. The starting wage and pattern of raises varies across Wal-Mart stores, depending on local market conditions.
Two studies find negative effects of Wal-Mart on the pay of retail employees, but due to a lack of available data, these studies are limited in their ability to not control for worker and job characteristics (such as hours, shifts, and job responsibilities consists of a record-breaking 1.5-2.0 million current and former female employees. Other accusations against Wal-Mart include locking overnight employees in stores (Greenhouse, 2004 ) and hiring illegal immigrants. Of course, any large employer inevitably attracts some accusations and lawsuits, and there has been no research to date on whether Wal-Mart has committed more actual violations than its competitors on an employee-weighted basis.
Consumers
Consumers The most ambitious work to date on the effect of new nontraditional grocery formats like superstores, mass merchandisers, and clubs on consumers is by Hausman and Leibtag 7 The differences between Hausman and Leibtag's (forthcoming) and Basker and Noel's (2006) results are probably due to two factors. First, Hausman and Leibtag (forthcoming) calculate average prices using quantity weights, which is not possible to do with the ACCRA data. Second, ACCRA data exclude membership clubs, which use two-part tariff pricing (an annual membership fee, and lower prices) and are therefore likely to pull down the average price for the nontraditional outlets relative to Wal-Mart's prices. Hausman and Leibtag (2004, 2007) make the point that outlet substitution by consumers -switching from traditional grocery stores to the nontraditional superstores, mass merchandisers, and clubs -has increased the bias in the Consumer Price Index because the Bureau of Labor Statistics makes the strong assumption that all price differences between stores in a single market at a given point in time are due to quality differences, even if the good is homogeneous.
(forthcoming). Hausman and Leibtag do not distinguish between Wal-Mart stores and other
nontraditional new sellers in their data, although Wal-Mart is likely responsible for the bulk of this category of nontraditional expenditures. Using household-level grocery purchase data that include not only prices but also quantity purchased and store, Hausman and Leibtag estimate the effect of the expansion of the nontraditional format on prices at traditional grocery stores, and combine these estimates with information on quantities purchased and store choices to calculate welfare gains. To estimate the price effect on competitors, Hausman and Leibtag regress the average quantity-weighted price charged by traditional supermarkets for a given item -such as apple juice, eggs, or ice cream -on city and time fixed effects, and on the share of consumer expenditures at superstores, mass merchandisers, and clubs of that item in each city and month. Because consumers' expenditure share at superstores, mass merchandisers, and clubs is in part a function of the prices that traditional grocery stores charge, Hausman and Leibtag (forthcoming) instrument for this product-specific expenditure share using the expenditure share at superstores, mass merchandisers, and clubs aggregated across all products in the data, arguing that each good contributes a negligible share to overall expenditure. The instrument is valid -picking up shifts due to all other factorsas long as the price of good 1 (say, bananas) in one venue does not have a direct effect on the price of good 2 (say, yogurt) in another venue, and no omitted variable affects both. They find that over a four-year period, expansion of superstores, mass merchandisers, and clubs has caused traditional supermarkets to lower prices by approximately 3 percent, with some variation across products. while others, such as CVS and Walgreen's, declined to follow suit (Rowland and Krasner, 2006) . Very little is known about the effect of this competition on the prices consumers actually pay for prescription drugs, on brand-name premiums, and on the drugstore and brand choices consumers make.
In addition to a wide range of products and a growing menu of services, Wal-Mart also sells convenience associated with one-stop shopping (Basker, Klimek, and Van, 2007) .
Consistent with the idea that consumers value one-stop shopping, Chiou (2005) finds that consumers have a preference for shopping at Wal-Mart, even after accounting for price and location differences. She estimates a discrete choice model using data on consumers' DVD purchases by title, store, and price, and including consumer location and demographic information and the locations of all the relevant stores, including mass merchants, video stores, electronics stores, and online retailers. Parameter estimates for a demand equation that allows consumer preferences to depend on travel distance, price, individual demographics, and store identity in a flexible way imply that the average consumer would be willing to pay a premium to shop at Wal-Mart over the alternatives.
For some goods, however, lower prices and increased convenience are partially mitigated by lower service levels, reduced product offerings, and other disamenities. It is often observed that Wal-Mart carries fewer brands and varieties of common goods -that it specializes in product breadth, rather than depth -a strategy that may have contributed to its lower inventory costs and stronger bargaining position with suppliers. By revealed preference, many consumers are willing to accept this tradeoff, but those whose tastes do not conform to Wal-Mart's selection could be made worse off by it if their favored retailers shut down or scale back operations. Wal-Mart does not carry music CDs whose lyrics or cover art it considers offensive, for example. Consumers seeking such items have to go elsewhere, and often pay a higher price.
Competitors
Inevitably, in a competitive environment, the emergence of a more-efficient firm will tend to edge out some less-efficient incumbents, and is likely to prompt others to change some of their practices. This is, indeed, what we observe in the case of Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart's competitors divide into two broad categories: "local" competitors, mostly incumbent retailers in markets Wal-Mart enters, and other large retail chains with which Wal-Mart competes in many markets. Wal-Mart's entry causes a small number of local competitors in each market to shut down. Its effect on large chain competitors is more complicated, and needs further study to be properly quantified.
Local Competitors
Micro data from the U.S. Census Bureau shows that normal "churn" is already high in the retail sector -50-60 percent of retailers that exist one year disappear within five years (Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda, 2004) Wal-Mart's net effect on the number of retailers operating in a market masks variation across both location and retail category. Within a county, some businesses fare better than others, and there may be pockets of decline and other pockets of growth, both at the subsector level (say, grocery stores vs. home improvement stores) and geographically. For example, in a case study of the Chicago market using scanner data from Dominick's Finer Foods, entry of a Wal-Mart discount store, which does not sell groceries, was estimated to increase revenue at an adjacent traditional grocery store, but to reduce revenue at a grocery store two miles away (Zhu, Singh, and Dukes, 2005) . This effect is similar to a mall anchor store which increases traffic to smaller stores in the mall (Pashigian and Gould, 1998; Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast, 2005) . Relatedly, Sobel and Dean (2006) cite anecdotal evidence that the composition of retailers changes following Wal-Mart's expansion into an area, but this finding has not been confirmed in systematic studies.
Global Competitors
As large retail chains grow in importance (Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda, 2005) , so do the strategic interactions among them. Wal-Mart's decisions not only affect its large chain competitors, but are also shaped by their anticipated responses, creating an interaction that is more subtle and complex than the relationship between Wal-Mart and its small-scale local competitors. McKinsey Global Institute (2001) cites evidence that other chain retailers have either explicitly emulated Wal-Mart or, more broadly, changed their practices in ways that reflect Wal-Mart's influence: Target's vice chairman is quoted as saying that Target is "the world's premier student of Wal-Mart" (p. 11).
The location patterns of the major chain retailers are jointly determined. For example, Kmart and Target take Wal-Mart's current and anticipated store locations into account when they decide which markets to enter. Estimates from structural models that account for this simultaneity indicate that Wal-Mart's deterrent effect on Kmart and Target is large relative to the counter effect these competitors exert on Wal-Mart, and has increased over time (Jia, 2005; Zhu, Singh, and Manuszak, 2005) Internet retailers are also affected by Wal-Mart's expansion. Using an ordinary least squares difference-in-difference specification, Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2007) find that the types of books consumers purchase from Amazon.com changes when a Wal-Mart or Target store opens in their town: more popular titles, which are likely to be carried by these large discounters, become relatively less popular on Amazon.com, and relatively more obscure titles take their place.
Suppliers
Wal-Mart's buying power has affected both its business relationships with suppliers and the way these suppliers organize internally. Several hundred of Wal-Mart's major suppliers have permanent offices near Wal-Mart's headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas, to facilitate these relationships (Useem, 2003) ; information sharing occurs in real time via Wal-Mart's Retail Link software. Wal-Mart also serves as a coordinating device for technology adoption where network externalities affect the profitability of adoption. According to Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout (2006) , Wal-Mart's entry into Mexico, for example, has resulted in large efficiency gains among (Mexican) upstream suppliers of soaps, detergents, and surfactants. Most recently, Wal-Mart is requiring its major suppliers to provide Radio Frequency Identification tags (Boyle, 2003) .
Wal-Mart's growth, and with it buying power, may have been originally motivated by a desire to obtain countervailing power against manufacturers and thereby lower costs (Chen, 2003) . Some anecdotal evidence suggests that Wal-Mart has used its bargaining power to push down wholesale prices, leading some to blame it for business failures among U.S. producers of consumer goods (Fishman, 2006) . If suppliers are perfectly competitive, and are already earning zero economic profit, it is hard to tell a story where Wal-Mart can force prices down. If suppliers are earning some rents, however, Wal-Mart's share of any surplus could well have increased as the chain has grown.
Wal-Mart is also at the center of anxieties about importing manufactured goods from low-cost producers: Wal-Mart's suppliers are disproportionately foreign and increasingly producing private-label goods. Wal-Mart was not always a major importer. From 1985 to 1992, Wal-Mart's "Buy American" campaign received much media attention. Wal-Mart promised, among other things, to pay up to a 5 percent premium for U.S.-made goods (Zellner, 1992) . This campaign ended abruptly in late 1992 after Dateline NBC aired a segment accusing Wal-Mart of producing private-label goods in Bangladesh, smuggling textiles into the United States in excess of quotas, and placing imported clothes on racks marked "Made in the USA" (Gladstone, 1992) . By 2004, Wal-Mart imported $18 billion worth of goods from China alone, accounting for 15.4 percent of U.S. imports of consumer goods for China that year . Wal-Mart sources 100 percent of its apparel from low-cost countries, and sells a much higher share of private-label apparel than other national apparel sellers (Gereffi, 2006) . Wal-Mart's scale facilitates its disproportionate use of direct global sourcing, because direct sourcing entails large fixed costs which require large volumes to justify. At the same time, global sourcing has contributed to Wal-Mart's advantage over smaller retailers by allowing it to procure inputs at lower cost; and as trade barriers have fallen, making imports cheaper, Wal-Mart's advantage has increased even further .
A public argument rages over whether a high level of imports of low-cost manufactured goods from China is good for the U.S. economy. This paper isn't the place to tackle that issue. Whatever one's position in that dispute, however, Wal-Mart's position as a global purchaser puts it at the center of the action.
Wal-Mart and Government Policy
As a national chain with many retail outlets, Wal-Mart interacts with all levels of government.
At the federal level, Wal-Mart's dependence on global suppliers guides its interest in U.S. trade policy that allows ease of importing. To that end, Wal-Mart has participated and helped shape CAFTA, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (Cummings, 2004) , and has lobbied for other open trade deals. At the state and local levels, Wal-Mart has an interest in regulations that affect wage and benefit policies, zoning, subsidies, and infrastructure development.
Until 1998, when Wal-Mart hired its first Washington lobbyist, it was fairly detached from the national political process. By 2005, its Political Action Committee (PAC) was one of the largest in Washington (Cummings, 2004) . In the 2004 election cycle, the Wal-Mart PAC donated over $2.7 million to political campaigns, four times as much as it had contributed in 2000, and more than 10 times the amount it contributed to national campaigns in 1996. If any such a law ever takes effect, Wal-Mart could attempt to minimize its effects by reducing store staffing levels, shutting down stores, or opening new stores at a reduced rate.
Wal-Mart
As a result, such a law would likely benefit competitors at the expense of consumers. Given the estimates cited earlier of Wal-Mart's effect on labor markets, it seems likely that limiting Wal-Mart would slightly reduce the number of retail jobs in many markets. If such legislation passes, a differences-in-differences comparison of the behavior of Wal-Mart and other large retailers in the affected city or state with their behavior in comparable regions (neighboring states or other large cities, for example) with regard to employment levels, hours of operation, wages, benefits, and prices, could be instrumental in informing the public-policy debate.
Local governments have been split in their response to Wal-Mart: some have attempted to limit Wal-Mart's access with zoning regulations and "living wage" ordinances, while others have welcomed Wal-Mart with infrastructure developments and other subsidies. An anti-Wal-Mart organization called Good Jobs First found that 90 percent of Wal-Mart's Distribution Centers, and many of its stores, received government subsidies totaling over $1 billion (Mattera and Purinton, 2004) . These subsidies have taken various forms, including infrastructure and site preparation assistance, job training grants, property tax exemptions and abatements, and sales tax abatements. Places that have limited Wal-Mart's entry have often cited its potential impact on urban sprawl, traffic, and congestion; however, research is needed to test these claims. One reason some communities offer Wal-Mart "welcome mats" is the common, but statistically unconfirmed, perception that it is better to have a Wal-Mart open in one's own jurisdiction than in a neighboring community. As a result, Wal-Mart may be able to pit local municipalities against one another to bid away a large share of the rents to the local community. An alternative explanation for subsidization -that Wal-Mart would not open in the area without it -is harder to support: Jia's (2005) estimates indicate that subsidized Wal-Mart stores are no less profitable than unsubsidized stores, gross of the subsidies.
Concluding Remarks
Wal-Mart's productivity advantage, due to its large and early investment in information technology, has permanently changed the retail sector. Wal-Mart continues to formulate ambitious expansion plans, including the addition of geographic markets, both in the United States and abroad, and new products, such as organic foods and financial services.
8 As its large chain competitors strive to emulate Wal-Mart's technological innovations, and suppliers worldwide become increasingly connected to their downstream buyers, the retail sector as a whole has become more efficient at providing consumers with the goods they want at better prices and with increased convenience.
Wal-Mart's biggest and most obvious effect is that it provides lower prices to consumers.
The competitive pressure the firm creates for competitors have lowered prices that consumers pay even when they do not shop at Wal-Mart; but they also reduce the profitability of other stores, and in some cases lead stores, especially small ones, to shut down. Wal-Mart's investment in technology and its tight control over the supply chain have also changed the competitive environment upstream. As Wal-Mart's size has made direct sourcing more profitable, and as the fixed costs of doing business with Wal-Mart have increased (due to factors ranging from the need for a local office in Bentonville, to Wal-Mart's requirement that suppliers install Radio Frequency Identification tags on shipments), small producers have made room for larger ones, and local producers have been displaced by foreign ones.
Wal-Mart has therefore contributed to the trend of increased outsourcing and imports.
While much is known about Wal-Mart, many of its economic effects remain unquantified.
Wal-Mart's effect on jobs is modest, and likely to be positive, but its effect on wagescontrolling for workers' characteristics -requires further investigation. Only anecdotal evidence exists about Wal-Mart's effects on product selection, and its impact on upstream industrial structure and the location of production are only beginning to be explored. WalMart's effects on local government expenditures, urban sprawl, traffic, crime, and social capital, have received some attention in popular discourse. Hicks (2005a,b) Finally, what is known about Wal-Mart's economic impact mainly concerns its shortand medium-run partial-equilibrium effects, but as Wal-Mart enters more and more markets, the general equilibrium interactions in markets as a whole could become substantial. In the long run, Wal-Mart's impact on local, national, and global economies will depend on the general-equilibrium responses of other firms, consumers, workers, and governments, and on the strategic interactions between these players and Wal-Mart. Trade (1982 and 2002) and Wal-Mart Annual Reports (1983 and .
